Refuting a Frankfurtian objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):207-213 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’.
Keywords Frankfurt  Principle of alternate possibilities  Moral responsibility  Free will
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    John Martin Fischer (1982). Responsibility and Control. Journal of Philsophy 79 (January):24-40.

    View all 10 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Ezio Di Nucci (2012). Priming Effects and Free Will. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):725-734.
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-07-25

    Total downloads

    75 ( #14,937 of 1,088,404 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,404 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.