Simply, false

Analysis 69 (1):69-78 (2009)
According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), A-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to A. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's (1991), Garcia's (1990), Sverdlik's (1996), Stout's (2005), and Adams's (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands.
Keywords Simple View  Bratman  Intentional Action  Intention
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/ann011
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,831
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1984). Two Faces of Intention. Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Ezio Di Nucci (2014). Avoiding and Alternate Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):1001-1007.
Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Embryo Loss and Double Effect. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):537-540.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

69 ( #45,904 of 1,724,747 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #268,625 of 1,724,747 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.