Simply, false

Analysis 69 (1):69-78 (2009)
Abstract According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), A-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to A. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's (1991), Garcia's (1990), Sverdlik's (1996), Stout's (2005), and Adams's (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands.
Keywords Simple View  Bratman  Intentional Action  Intention
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