Simply, false

Analysis 69 (1):69-78 (2009)
Abstract
According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), A-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to A. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's (1991), Garcia's (1990), Sverdlik's (1996), Stout's (2005), and Adams's (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands.
Keywords Simple View  Bratman  Intentional Action  Intention
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    References found in this work BETA
    Michael Bratman (1984). Two Faces of Intention. Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Embryo Loss and Double Effect. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):537-540.

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