Analysis 69 (1):69-78 (2009)
|Abstract||According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), A-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to A. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's (1991), Garcia's (1990), Sverdlik's (1996), Stout's (2005), and Adams's (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands.|
|Keywords||Simple View Bratman Intentional Action Intention|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Deborah Tollefsen (2005). Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
J. L. A. Garcia (1990). The Intentional and the Intended. Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams (2007). Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action. In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers.
Ezio Di Nucci (2008). Mind Out of Action. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Hugh J. McCann (1991). Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):25-36.
Ryan Wasserman (2011). Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
Ezio Di Nucci (2010). Rational Constraints and the Simple View. Analysis 70 (3):481-486.
Added to index2009-02-23
Total downloads60 ( #16,008 of 551,006 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 551,006 )
How can I increase my downloads?