David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 28 (1):9-21 (2009)
This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing (1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, (2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and (3) that the individuality of a cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a pespective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intutions about what counts as cognitive.
|Keywords||Extended mind Enactive approach Autonomy Precariousness Agency Mediation Individuation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Hanne De Jaegher (2009). Social Understanding Through Direct Perception? Yes, by Interacting. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):535-542.
Matthew MacKenzie (2010). Enacting the Self: Buddhist and Enactivist Approaches to the Emergence of the Self. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):75-99.
Miriam Kyselo (2013). Locked-in Syndrome and BCI - Towards an Enactive Approach to the Self. Neuroethics 6 (3):579-591.
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Shannon Spaulding (2012). Overextended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.
John Sutton (2006). Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind and the Civilizing Process. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Ashgate. 189--225.
Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
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