David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoria 16 (3):461-480 (2001)
Imre Lakatos’ idea that history of science without philosophy of science is blind may still be given a plausible interpretation today, even though his theory of the methodology of scientific research programmes has been rejected. The latter theory captures neither rationality in science nor the sense in which history must be told in a rational fashion. Nonetheless, Lakatos was right in insisting that the discipline of history consists of written rational reconstructions. In this paper, we will examine possible ways to cash out different, philosophically interesting, relationships: between rationality and science, between rationality and philosophy of science and/or epistemology, and, of course, between history and philosophy of science. Our conclusion is that the historian of science may be a philosopher of science as weIl, but if that philosophy of science is essentially a historical and dogmatic, it either cannot be used for history or it will deprive history of some of its most interesting and useful categories
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Peter Machamer & Franccsca Di Poppa (2001). Rational Reconstructions Revised. Theoria 16 (3):461-480.
Imre Lakatos (1971). History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions. In R. C. Buck & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Psa 1970. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Viii. D. Reidel. 91-108.
Bence Nanay (2010). Rational Reconstruction Reconsidered. The Monist 93 (4):598-617.
Colin Howson (ed.) (1976). Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences: The Critical Background to Modern Science, 1800-1905. Cambridge University Press.
James Robert Brown (1980). History and the Norms of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:236 - 248.
Andrés Rivadulla (1986). Empirismo Y Normatividad En Filosofía de la Ciencia. Theoria 1 (3):667-686.
Richard M. Burian (1977). More Than a Marriage of Convenience: On the Inextricability of History and Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 44 (1):1-42.
M. Motterlini (2002). Reconstructing Lakatos: A Reassessment of Lakatos' Epistemological Project in the Light of the Lakatos Archive. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):487-509.
T. Koetsier (1991). Lakatos' Philosophy of Mathematics: A Historical Approach. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
Ronald C. Curtis (1986). Are Methodologies Theories of Scientific Rationality? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1):135-161.
Kurt Bayertz (1991). Forschungsprogramm Und Wissenschaftsentwicklung. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (2):229 - 243.
Stephen J. Wykstra (1982). Curried Lakatos or, How Not to Spice Up the Norm-Ladenness Thesis. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:29 - 39.
Ernan McMullin (1981). The Rational and the Social. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:13-33.
Roger Ariew (1986). Descartes as Critic of Galileo's Scientific Methodology. Synthese 67 (1):77 - 90.
Kurt Bayertz (1991). Forschungsprogramm Und WissenschaftsentwicklungResearch Programme and Development of Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (2):229-243.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads1 ( #466,519 of 1,139,999 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #157,514 of 1,139,999 )
How can I increase my downloads?