The nature and structure of emotions
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophers have almost always said something about emotions and passions whenever they have discussed human mental life. Many have asserted that it is some emotions or, more broadly, passions, that are to be primarily valued and sought. These valued passionate states of mind might include emotions, moods, desires, belief-like feelings of conviction and commitment, and romantic or erotic love, which are typically scarcely distinguished. Not only are these states of mind lumped together, but the reasons why they are valued may likewise be various: they may be valued because of their intrinsic feeling (especially insofar as they are intense), through their long-term or deep effects on the rest of our practical and mental lives, through their effects on others’ lives, or even in the glimpse they give us of an object that transcends our mundane and superficial concerns, as in love, peak experiences, or intimations of God, Beauty, or Nature. Others have claimed that it is in the subduing or elimination of some or all of these passions that the ideal human life consists. Again, what precisely are the objectionable passions is typically not delineated, and why such mental states are objectionable may be diverse and even unspecified. One might resent their "disruptive" nature on our mental life, especially insofar as some of them stem from external, uncontrollable sources, and instead seek a calm state that is within one’s control and not subject to these whimsical externalities. Or one can see many or all passions as disruptive of control and success in our inner or outer life, or in the lives of others. We might call this latter group the anti-emotional Rationalists, and the former group the pro-emotional Romantics
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Elisa A. Hurley (2007). Working Passions: Emotions and Creative Engagement with Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):79-104.
Dominik Perler (2005). Emotions and Cognitions. Fourteenth-Century Discussions on the Passions of the Soul. Vivarium 43 (2):250-274.
Robert C. Solomon (2003). Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice. Oxford University Press.
Markku Roinila (2011). Uneasiness and Passions in Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais II, Xx. In Breger Herbert, Herbst Jürgen & Erdner Sven (eds.), Natur und Subjekt. IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress Vorträge 3. Teil. Leibniz Geschellschaft.
Edoardo Zamuner (2008). Knowledge and Self-Knowledge of Emotions. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
John M. Cooper (2005). The Emotional Life of the Wise. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (S1):176-218.
Robert C. Solomon (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #107,014 of 1,696,560 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?