Michael Polanyi's Epistemology Of Science And Its Implications For A Problem In Moral Philosophy

Tradition and Discovery 29 (1):49-59 (2002)
Ethical particularists allege that there are, on account of epistemological limitations, no such things as general moral principles. This paper defends the existence of general moral principles by adapting and appropriating Polanyi’s epistemology of science to this problem in moral philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/traddisc2002/20032919
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