Synthese 147 (2):229 - 275 (2005)
|Abstract||In 'belief revision' a theory í µí²¦ is revised with a formula Ï† resulting in a revised theory í µí²¦ * Ï†. Typically, Â¬Ï† is in í µí²¦, one has to give up belief in Â¬Ï† by a process of retraction, and Ï† is in í µí²¦ * Ï†. We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory í µí²¦ wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein BÂ¬Ï† is true. The revision with Ï† is a program *Ï† that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*Ï†], that is interpreted as a binary relation âŸ¦*Ï†âŸ§ between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes Ï† in the resulting state, i.e., BÏ† is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose 'doxastic epistemic models' that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Hans P. Van Ditmarsch (2005). Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Synthese 147 (2):229-275.
Giacomo Bonanno (2008). Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework. In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
Johan van Benthem (2007). Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
Gabriella Pigozzi, G. Boella, C. Costa Pereirdaa, A. Tettamanzi & and Leon van der Torre, Choosing Your Beliefs.
Kevin T. Kelly (1999). Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia. Erkenntnis 50 (1):11-58.
Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson & Hanan Polansky (1996). Belief Change as Change in Epistemic Entrenchment. Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174.
Peter Gardenfors (1990). Belief Revision and Relevance. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:349 - 365.
Giacomo Bonanno (2007). Axiomatic Characterization of the AGM Theory of Belief Revision in a Temporal Logic. Artificial Intelligence 171 (2-3):144-160.
Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier GarcÃa, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari (2013). Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193.
Robert Stalnaker (2009). Iterated Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 70 (2):189 - 209.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads6 ( #154,676 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?