Mind 115 (459):731-740 (2006)
|Abstract||In this reply, we defend our argument for the incompleteness of Genuine Modal Realism against Paseau's criticisms. Paseau claims that isomorphic set of worlds represent the same possibilities, but not only is this implausible, it is inimical to the target of our paper: Lewis's theory of possible worlds. We argue that neither Paseau's model-theoretic results nor his comparison to arithmetic carry over to GMR. We end by distinguishing two notions of incompleteness and urge that, for all that Paseau has said, GMR remains incomplete in the relevant sense.|
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