Philosophical Studies 112 (1):69-91 (2003)
|Abstract||In this paper we consider, and reject, Harold Langsams defenceof the Theory of Appearing, in this journal (1997), in the faceof three standard arguments against it. These arguments are:the argument from hallucination; the argument from the samecause-same effect principle; and the argument from perceptualtime-gap.|
|Keywords||Appearing Cause Experience Hallucination Metaphysics Perception Langsam, H|
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