Are there true contradictions? A critical discussion of Graham Priest's, beyond the limits of thought
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29 (2):289-299 (1998)
| Abstract | The present article critically examines three aspects of Graham Priest's dialetheic analysis of very important kinds of limitations (the limit of what can be expressed, described, conceived, known, or the limit of some operation or other). First, it is shown that Priest's considerations focusing on Hegel's account of the infinite cannot be sustained, mainly because Priest seems to rely on a too restrictive notion of object. Second, we discuss Priest's treatment of the paradoxes in Cantorian set-theory. It is shown that Priest does not address the issue in full generality; rather, he relies on a reading of Cantor which implicitly attributes a very strong principle concerning quantification over arbitrary domains to Cantor. Third, the main piece of Priest's work, the so-called “inclosure schema”, is investigated. This schema is supposed to formalize the core of many well-known paradoxes. We claim, however, that formally the schema is not sound. | |||||||||
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Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2006). Hyper-Contradictions, Generalized Truth Values and Logics of Truth and Falsehood. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4).
Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2003). Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought. Philosophy East and West 53 (1):1-21.
Graham Priest (2002). Beyond the Limits of Thought. Oxford University Press.
I. Grattan-Guinness (1998). Discussion. Structural Similarity of Structuralism? Comments on Priest's Analysis of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference. Mind 107 (428):823-834.
Emil Badici (2008). The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596.
Graham Priest (2010). Badici on Inclosures and the Liar Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):359-366.
Laurence Goldstein (2005). Introduction. The Monist 88 (1):3-10.
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