Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (2):341-364 (1999)
|Abstract||Two of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism are examined in detail. One of them is developed as an extension of a model-theoretic argument against mathematical realism based on considerations concerning the so-called Skolem-Paradox in set theory. This argument against mathematical realism is also treated explicitly. The article concentrates on the fine structure of the arguments because most commentators have concentrated on the major premisses of Putnam's argument and especially on his treatment of metaphysical realism. It is shown that the validity of Putnam's arguments is doubtful and that realists are by no means forced to accept the theses Putnam ascribes to them. It is concluded that Putnam fails to give convincing arguments for rejecting mathematical or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, Putnam's internal realism is discussed critically.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism. Analysis 44 (3):134--40.
Timothy Bays (2007). More on Putnam's Models: A Reply to Belloti. Erkenntnis 67 (1):119--35.
D. C. Smith (2003). What is so Magical About a Theory of Intrinsic Intentionality? Philosophical Papers 32 (1):83-96.
Iris Einheuser (2010). The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Quantifying Over Everything. Dialectica 64 (2):237-246.
José Tomás Alvarado (2002). El Argumento de Teoria de Modelos de Putnam y la Metodologia para la Comprension de las Nociones Intencionales. Theoria 17 (3):541-561.
Tim Button (2011). The Metamathematics of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Arguments. Erkenntnis 74 (3):321-349.
Byeong D. Lee (2003). Douven on Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument. Erkenntnis 58 (1):7--12.
Bas C. van Fraassen (1997). Putnam's Paradox: Metaphysical Realism Revamped and Evaded. Philosophical Perspectives 11:17-42.
G. H. Merrill (1980). The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):69-81.
Timothy Bays (2008). Two Arguments Against Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):193–213.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #16,839 of 549,006 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,082 of 549,006 )
How can I increase my downloads?