Abstract

The author re-examines Hare's multiple ways of connecting his metaethical with his normative doctrine, which is in formal sense determined as "Kantian utilitarianism", and in substantive sense as "preference-utilitarianism". Critical references to both dimensions of utilitarian doctrine aim at indication on scopes and limits of Hare's ambitious redefinition of the doctrine. Further on he discusses about so-called "necessary ingredient" of moral reasoning under the name of "sympathetic imagination", which Hare grasps in his developed theory not only as a normative demand but also as a logical thesis. Finally, he considers kinds of preferences that can or cannot be recognized as morally relevant. Autor preispituje Herove visestruke pokusaje povezivanja metaetickog i normativno-etickog ucenja, koje je u formalnom smislu odredjeno kao "kantijanski utilitarizam", a u supstantivnom kao "utilitarizam preferencija". Kriticki osvrti na obe dimenzije utilitaristicke doktrine ciljaju na to da ukazu na domete i granice Herove ambiciozne redefinicije ove teorije. Potom se raspravlja o tzv. "nuznom sastojku" moralnog rasudjivanja pod imenom "simpateticka imaginacija", koju Her u svojoj razvijenoj teoriji poima ne samo kao normativni zahtev vec i kao izvesnu logicku tezu. I najzad, razmatraju se vrste preferencija koje, uz pomoc odredjenog niza kriterijuma, mogu ili ne mogu biti priznate kao moralno relevantne.