David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685 (2011)
In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ?infallibilism?, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has greater explanatory power than fallibilism. In particular, I argue that an infallibilist can easily explain why assertions of ?p, but possibly not-p? (where the ?possibly? is read as referring to epistemic possibility) is infelicitous in terms of the knowledge rule of assertion. But a fallibilist cannot. Furthermore, an infallibilist can explain the infelicity of utterances of ?p, but I don't know that p? and ?p might be true, but I'm not willing to say that for all I know, p is true?, and why when a speaker thinks p is epistemically possible for her, she will agree (if asked) that for all she knows, p is true. The simplest explanation of these facts entails infallibilism. Fallibilists have tried and failed to explain the infelicity of ?p, but I don't know that p?, but have not even attempted to explain the last two facts. I close by considering two facts that seem to pose a problem for infallibilism, and argue that they don't
|Keywords||knowledge attributions epistemic modals skepticism fallibilism contextualism knowledge epistemology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Dylan Dodd (2012). Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries. Erkenntnis 77 (1):95-120.
Eric Yang (2013). Thinking Animals, Disagreement, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.
Baron Reed (2012). Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
Anthony Robert Booth (2014). The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis. Erkenntnis 79 (3):625-638.
Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2012). A Tale of Two Fallibilists: On an Argument for Infallibilism. Thought 1 (3):195-199.
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