McDowell and Identity Theories of Truth

Analysis 55 (3):160 - 165 (1995)
Abstract
The main thesis of this paper is that John McDowell (in his Mind and World) tries to occupy a position that is not coherently statable; namely, that facts have objects and properties as constituents and are yet identical with true (Fregean) Thoughts. This position is contrasted with two other identity theories of truth: the robust theory, in which true propositions are identified with facts (which are understood to have objects and properties as constituents); and the modest theory, in which facts are identified with true Fregean Thoughts. I argue that the modest theory is to be preferred
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    Pascal Engel (2001). The False Modesty of the Identity Theory of Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.
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