Synthese 156 (2):383-401 (2007)
|Abstract||This paper argues that a consideration of the problem of providing truthmakers for negative truths undermines truthmaker theory. Truthmaker theorists are presented with an uncomfortable dilemma. Either they must take up the challenge of providing truthmakers for negative truths, or else they must explain why negative truths are exceptions to the principle that every truth must have a truthmaker. The first horn is unattractive since the prospects of providing truthmakers for negative truths do not look good neither absences, nor totality states of affairs, nor Graham Priest and J.C. Beall’s ‘polarities’ (Beall, 2000; Priest, 2000) are up to the job. The second horn, meanwhile, is problematic because restricting the truthmaker principle to atomic truths, or weakening it to the thesis that truth supervenes on being, undercuts truthmaker theory’s original motivation. The paper ends by arguing that truthmaker theory is, in any case, an under-motivated doctrine because the groundedness of truth can be explained without appeal to the truthmaker principle. This leaves us free to give the ommonsensical and deflationary explanation of negative truths that common-sense suggests.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden (2006). Negative Truths From Positive Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.
Mark Jago (2012). The Truthmaker Non-Maximalist's Dilemma. Mind 121 (484):903-918.
Josh Parsons (2006). Negative Truths From Positive Facts? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):591 – 602.
John Heil (2006). The Legacy of Linguisticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244.
D. M. Armstrong (2000). Difficult Cases in the Theory of Truthmaking. The Monist 83 (1):150-160.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). Comments on Merricks'struth and Ontology. Philosophical Books 49 (4):292-301.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmakers. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Stephen Mumford (2007). Negative Truth and Falsehood. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):45 - 71.
Michael Veber (2008). How to Derive a 'Not' From an 'Is': A Defense of the Incompatibility View of Negative Truths. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 9 (1):79-91.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads102 ( #7,531 of 722,860 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,860 )
How can I increase my downloads?