Why Williamson should be a sceptic

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649 (2007)
Abstract
Timothy Williamson's epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is 1. I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it with Peter Klein's, and argue that Klein's account leads to a certain problem which Williamson's can avoid. Williamson can allow that perceptual knowledge is possible and that all knowledge is evidence, while at the same time avoiding Klein's problem. But while Williamson can allow that we know some things through experience, there are very many things he must say we cannot know. Given just how very many these are, he should be considered a sceptic.
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    References found in this work BETA
    A. L. Brueckner (2000). Klein on Closure and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):139-151.
    Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
    Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Dylan Dodd (2011). Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.
    Clayton Littlejohn (2008). From E = K to Scepticism? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):679-684.

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