Of Mind and Meaning

Tradition and Discovery 20 (2):28-42 (1993)
Abstract This paper examine’s Jerry Fodor’s attempt to naturalize the human mind by encompassing it within a new mechanistic ontology. It then explores Polanyi’s view of mind’s embodiment and meaning’s emergence in an effort to uncover some fundamental incoherencies in Fodor’s naturalization project
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