Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations

This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.
Keywords epistemic rationality  function  epistemic communism  coordination  testimony
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00566.x
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Sophie Horowitz (2013). Immoderately Rational. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-16.

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