Interpretive Charity and Content Externalism

Abstract Interpretive charity is an important principle in devising the content of propositional attitudes and their expression. I want to argue that it does not square well with externalism about content. Although my argument clearly also applies to a principle of maximizing truth (as it requires only the true belief - component of knowledge), I will focus my attention to Timothy Williamson’s more intriguing recent proposal of maximizing knowledge.
Keywords Theory of Meaning  Externalism  Principle of Charity  Knowledge Maximization  Williamson
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