The Unthinkable, Might It Be?
| Abstract | A basic intuition about epistemic possibility is the following: It might be that p iff it is open whether p. The standard way of cashing out this intuition is: It might be that p iff it is reconcilable with one’s informational state that p. However, there are certain examples which point to a lacuna in this conception. They indicate that epistemic possibility is restricted to what one can conceive as an alternative, what one can have a cognitive attitude to. | |||||||||
| Keywords | might epistemic possibility contextualism relativism | |||||||||
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