David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):309-328 (2006)
Our utterances are typically if not always ‘‘situated,'' in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated parameters need not be mentally represented. In this paper, I try to make precise the notion of representation at stake here. In one sense of ‘representation', something is represented if it is inferentially relevant. In another, less demanding sense, something is represented if it is relevant to the construction of a contextsensitive, ad hoc concept. Ad hoc concepts act as ‘‘proxies'' for cognitively more demanding representations. They ‘‘imitate'' the latter's epistemic and pragmatic roles while being inferentially less sophisticated. Thus, there are two senses in which a thought can be said to be situated: (1) its truth-value is relative to a non-represented contextual parameter, (2) its truth-value is not itself relative, but it involves a context-sensitive, ad hoc concept
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jérôme Dokic (2006). From Linguistic Contextualism to Situated Cognition: The Case of Ad Hoc Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):309 – 328.
Shaun Gallagher (2009). Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 35--53.
Robert A. Wilson & Andy Clark (2009). How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take its Course. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 55--77.
Eros Corazza & Jérôme Dokic (2012). Situated Minimalism Versus Free Enrichment. Synthese 184 (2):179-198.
Robert Wilson & Andy Clark (2006). Situated Cognition: Letting Nature Take its Course. In M. Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition.
Robert D. Rupert (2009). Innateness and the Situated Mind. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press 96--116.
William Clancey (1995). How Situated Cognition is Different From Situated Robotics. In Luc Steels & Rodney Brooks (eds.), The "Artificial Life" Route to "Artificial Intelligence": Building Situated Embodied Agents. Hillsdale, Nj: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 227-236.
Peter Ludlow (2005). Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn in Epistemology. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press
Peter Slezak (1999). Situated Cognition. Perspectives on Cognitive Science.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2007). Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):387-394.
Christoph Jäger (2012). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. Analysis 72 (3):491-498.
John Sutton (2009). Remembering. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press
Helen De Cruz (2009). Is Linguistic Determinism an Empirically Testable Hypothesis? Logique Et Analyse 208 (208):327-341.
Added to index2011-11-22
Total downloads11 ( #293,030 of 1,790,397 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #201,864 of 1,790,397 )
How can I increase my downloads?