Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge

Synthese 166 (1):1 - 20 (2009)
Abstract
In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective form of the margin for error principle defended by Williamson in his account of knowledge. We argue that Williamson’s reductio rests on the inappropriate identification of distinct forms of knowledge. More specifically, an important distinction between perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual knowledge is wanting in his statement and analysis of the puzzle. We present an alternative account of this puzzle, based on a modular conception of knowledge: the (KK) principle and the margin for error principle can coexist, provided their domain of application is referred to the right sort of knowledge.
Keywords Margin for error  Positive introspection  Modularity of knowledge  Epistemic paradoxes  Epistemic logic  Perception  Reflection
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,068
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Denis Bonnay & Paul Egré (2008). Margins for Error in Context. In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 103--107.

View all 9 references

Citations of this work BETA
Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré (2009). Inexact Knowledge with Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179 - 227.
Eleonora Cresto (2012). A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

42 ( #43,620 of 1,101,812 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #52,381 of 1,101,812 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.