Shades and concepts

Analysis 61 (3):193-201 (2001)
Abstract
In this paper, we criticise the claim, made by J. McDowell and B. Brewer, that the contents of perceptual experience are purely conceptual
Keywords Color  Concept  Content  Epistemology  Experience  Perception
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Philippe Chuard (2007). Indiscriminable Shades and Demonstrative Concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):277 – 306.
    Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.

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