Antirealism, presentism and bivalence

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DOI 10.1080/09672550903306068
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References found in this work BETA
John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.
Yuval Dolev (2000). Dummett's Antirealism and Time. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):253–276.

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