Ethics 101 (3):537-559 (1991)
|Abstract||Retributive accounts of the justification of criminal punishment are increasingly fashionable, yet their proponents frequently rely more on suggestive metaphor than on reasoned explanation. This article seeks to question whether any such coherent explanations are possible. I briefly sketch some general doubts about the validity of retributivist views and then critique three recent efforts (by George Sher, Jean Hampton, and Michael Moore) to put retributivism on a sound basis|
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