A Law-Constitutive Explanation of Fundamental Material Objects and “Bodies that Surround Us”

Prolegomena 10 (1):67-85 (2011)
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Abstract

What becomes of our clearest theories of explanation, when faced with the unpalatable quantum phenomena that seem to undermine the direct conceptual connection between the fundamental material entities and the self-standing material objects of everyday parlance? The general explanatory theory advocates unification of explanatory concepts with everyday discourse, identification of essentially similar characteristics between direct experience and the hypothesised explanatory ontology, and a conceptualisation of phenomena in terms of objects enduring causally regulated change. On the other hand quantum theory feeds antirealist suspicions about the worth of realist explanatory endeavour with examples of phenomena in which the structure of material separation and individuation based on spatial extension is insufficient for construction of deeper explanatory narratives. An example from history of science, that of Newton’s law-constitutive definition of objects in response to D escartes problem of bodies is used to suggest a possible strategy for explanations unifying the quantum and common-sense conceptual domains, provided the anti-realist challenge to such enterprise is read as questioning the epistemological justification of interpretation of experience in both cases.Što se događa s najjasnijim dostupnim teorijama objašnjenja kada se suoče s problematičnim kvantnim pojavama koje naizgled potkopavaju neposrednu konceptualnu poveznicu između fundamentalnih materijalnih entiteta i samoopstojnih materijalnih predmeta iz svakodnevnog govora? Opća teorija objašnjenja preporuča objedinjenje teoretskih eksplanatornih pojmova sa svakodnevnim govorom, određenje esencijalno sličnih karakteristika između neposrednog iskustva i hipotetske eksplanatorne ontologije te konceptualizaciju pojava kroz predmete koji istraju kroz uzročno regulirane promjene. S druge strane, kvantna teorija potkrjepljuje antirealistične sumnje o valjanosti eksplanatornog nastojanja realizma primjerima pojava u kojima je struktura materijalne razdvojenosti i individuacije temeljene na prostornoj protežnosti nedovoljna za izgradnju dubljih eksplanatornih narativa. Primjerom iz povijesti znanosti, Newtonovom definicijom predmeta temeljenom na zakonima kao odgovorom na Descartesov problem materijalnih tijela, daje se moguća strategija izgradnje objašnjenja koja objedinjuju kvantne i “zdravorazumske” konceptualne domene, ukoliko se antirealistična kritika te izgradnje u oba slučaja shvati kao propitivanje epistemološkog opravdanja tumačenja iskustva

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References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.James Cargile - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (2):320-323.

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