Can the theory of evolution be falsified?
Acta Biotheoretica 33 (1) (1984)
| Abstract | In this paper we discuss the epistemological positions of evolution theories. A sharp distinction is made between the theory that species evolved from common ancestors along specified lines of descent (here called the theory of common descent), and the theories intended as causal explanations of evolution (e.g. Lamarck's and Darwin's theory). The theory of common descent permits a large number of predictions of new results that would be improbable without evolution. For instance, (a) phylogenetic trees have been validated now; (b) the observed order in fossils of new species discovered since Darwin's time could be predicted from the theory of common descent; (c) owing to the theory of common descent, the degrees of similarity and difference in newly discovered properties of more or less related species could be predicted. Such observations can be regarded as attempts to falsify the theory of common descent. We conclude that the theory of common descent is an easily-falsifiable & often-tested & still-not-falsified theory, which is the strongest predicate a theory in an empirical science can obtain. Theories intended as causal explanations of evolution can be falsified essentially, and Lamarck's theory has been falsified actually. Several elements of Darwin's theory have been modified or falsified: new versions of a theory of evolution by natural selection are now the leading scientific theories on evolution. We have argued that the theory of common descent and Darwinism are ordinary, falsifiable scientific theories. | |||||||||
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Charles Darwin (1993/1998). The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or, the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. Modern Library.
Joel Cracraft (1987). Species Concepts and the Ontology of Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):329-346.
Jean Gayon (1996). The Individuality of the Species: A Darwinian Theory? — From Buffon to Ghiselin, and Back to Darwin. Biology and Philosophy 11 (2):215-244.
David L. Hull (1988). A Mechanism and its Metaphysics: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. Biology and Philosophy 3 (2):123-155.
A. Aaron Snyder (1982). Taxonomy and Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:512 - 521.
Carla E. Kary (1990). One Causal Mechanism in Evolution: One Unit of Selection. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):290-296.
Walter J. Bock (2010). Multiple Explanations in Darwinian Evolutionary Theory. Acta Biotheoretica 58 (1).
Robert T. Pennock (1995). Moral Darwinism: Ethical Evidence for the Descent of Man. Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):287-307.
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