Online research in philosophy

This article traces the "dialogue" between the work of the philosophers Luce Irigaray and Emmanuel Levinas. It attempts to construct a more nuanced discussion than has been given to date of Irigaray's critique of Levinas, particularly as formulated in "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas" (Irigaray 1991). It suggests that the concepts of the feminine and of voluptuosity articulated by Levinas have more to contribute to Irigaray's project of an ethics of sexual difference than she herself sometimes appears to think.

In this paper, I evaluate Elizabeth Grosz's corporeal feminism and ontology of sexual difference(s), by moving through her Derridean and Irigarayian conceptual heritage. The question here is asked whether Grosz succeeds at deconstructing feminism's enemy; biological determinism, and if she deconstructs binary dichotomizes or in the end reinforces them. Grosz's Darwinian ontology of sexual differences is then analyzed via these two leading motives, and through the perspectives of Derrida and Irigaray.

Luce Irigaray's fearlessness towards speaking the body has earned for her work the dismissive label "essentialist." But Irigaray's Speculum de l'autre femme and Ce Sexe qui n'en est pas un suggest that essence may not be the unitary, monolithic, in short, essentialist category that anti-essentialists so often presume it to be. Irigaray strategically deploys essentialism for at least two reasons: first, to reverse and to displace Jacques Lacan's phallomorphism; and second, to expose the contradiction at the heart of Aristotelian metaphysics which denies women access to "Essence" while at the same time positing the essence of "Woman" precisely as non-essential (as matter).

: De Beauvoir and Irigaray are archetypes of two opposed feminisms: egalitarian feminism and radical feminism of difference. Yet a filiation exists between de Beauvoir's claim, that women is Other, and Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman. This paper explores the relationship between de Beauvoir's and Irigaray's notion of otherness. It argues that Irigaray deforms de Beauvoir's categories, and that de Beauvoir provides a more coherent prospect for the development of an authentic feminine subjectivity.

Anglo-American embodiments of poststructuralist and French feminism often align themselves with the texts of either Michel Foucault or Luce Irigaray. Interrogating this alleged distance between Foucault and Irigaray, I show how it reinscribes the phallic field of concepts and categories within feminist discourses. Framing both Foucault and Irigaray as exceeding Jacques Lacan's metamorphosis of G.W.F. Hegel's Concept, I suggest that engaging their styles might yield richer tools for articulating the differences within our different lives.

This article reconsiders the issue of Luce Irigaray's proximity to Jacques Derrida on the question of woman. I use Derrida's reading of Nietzsche in Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (1979) and Irigaray's reading of Heidegger in L'Oubli de l'air (1983) to argue that reading them as supplements to one another is more accurate and more productive for feminism than separating one from the other. I conclude by laying out the benefits for feminism that such a reading would offer.

In this paper, I tried to sketch out Luce Irigaray's ambiguous relationship with the tradition of western psychoanalysis.

I evaluated her critiques on Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, and defended the idea that she succeeds at transcending the many feminist evils of psychoanalysis as a tradition, by feminizing the psychoanalytical practice.