Synthese 168 (1):53 - 79 (2009)
|Abstract||It is often assumed that indeterminacy in mereological relations—in particular, indeterminacy in which collections of objects have fusions—leads immediately to indeterminacy in what objects there are in the world. This assumption is generally taken as a reason for rejecting mereological vagueness. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. I hope to show that the connection between the two forms of vagueness is not nearly so clear-cut as has been supposed.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Hud Hudson (2000). Universalism, Four Dimensionalism, and Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):547-560.
Dan López de Sa (2006). Is 'Everything' Precise? Dialectica 60 (4):397–409.
Nikk Effingham (2009). Universalism, Vagueness and Supersubstantivalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):35 – 42.
Trenton Merricks (2001). Varieties of Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
By Kristie Miller (2008). Endurantism, Diachronic Vagueness and the Problem of the Many. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242–253.
Matti Eklund (2008). Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):117-140.
Kristie Miller (2006). Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity. Erkenntnis 64 (2):223 - 230.
Donald Smith (2006). The Vagueness Argument for Mereological Universalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):357–368.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads62 ( #18,269 of 722,774 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,982 of 722,774 )
How can I increase my downloads?