Reference and definite descriptions

Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304 (1966)
Abstract
Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite differently. Moreover, a definite description occurring in one and the same sentence may, on different occasions of its use, function in either way. The failure to deal with this duality of function obscures the genuine referring use of definite descriptions. The best known theories of definite descriptions, those of Russell and Strawson, I shall suggest, are both guilty of this. Before discussing this distinction in use, I will mention some features of these theories to which it is especially relevant
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Stephen Neale (1992). Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):509 - 559.
John Turri (2011). Contingent A Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
Joseph Levine (2010). Demonstrative Thought. Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.

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