Summation relations and portions of stuff

Philosophical Studies 143 (2):167 - 185 (2009)
According to the prevalent ‘sum view’ of stuffs, each portion of stuff is a mereological sum of its subportions. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the sum view in the light of a modal temporal mereology which distinguishes between different varieties of summation relations. While admitting David Barnett’s recent counter-example to the sum view (Barnett, Philos Rev 113:89–100, 2004), we show that there is nonetheless an important sense in which all portions of stuff are sums of their subportions. We use our summation relations to develop, as an alternative to the sum view, an analysis of stuffs that distinguishes between the ways in which different sorts of stuffs are sums of their subportions.
Keywords Mereology  Summation  Composition  Stuff
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    Paul Needham (2010). Transient Things and Permanent Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):147 – 166.
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