David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Sociological Theory 21 (2):175-190 (2003)
This paper proposes criteria for distinguishing those types of social forms that are susceptible to lawlike explanation from those that are susceptible to interpretive accounts. The main criterion concerns the rankability of choice alternatives. The choice process is modeled as having two subprocesses. The first subprocess is a rational one in which unacceptable decision alternatives are eliminated, reducing the universe of alternatives to the set of interchangeably acceptable options, termed the admissible set. In the second subprocess, an arbitrary choice is made from the admissible set. In rational-choice settings, the admissible set consists of just one element, the optimum. However, this is clearly not the only possibility, as the example of language, with its plurality of interchangeable phonemic options, bears witness. The fundamental concept: At one extreme-the extreme of language-the admissible set is large and the arbitrary-choice subprocess dominates the rational-choice subprocess. At the other extreme-the extreme of rational-choice theory-the admissible set consists of a single element and the rational-choice subprocess dominates the arbitrary-choice subprocess. Social law has its proper home in those territories of human activity where the admissible set is small; social interpretation has its proper home in those regions where the admissible set is large
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paul Anand, Prastanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.) (2009). The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press, USA.
Johan E. Gustafsson (2010). Freedom of Choice and Expected Compromise. Social Choice and Welfare 35 (1):65–79.
Giacomo Bonanno (2009). Rational Choice and Agm Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 173:1194-1203.
Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane (2010). Coherent Choice Functions Under Uncertainty. Synthese 172 (1):157 - 176.
Walter Bossert (2001). Choices, Consequences, and Rationality. Synthese 129 (3):343 - 369.
T. A. Slaman (1986). ∑1 Definitions with Parameters. Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (2):453 - 461.
Brian Mcneil (1938). Notes and Comments. New Scholasticism 12 (2):197-198.
Sy D. Friedman (1979). HC of an Admissible Set. Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (1):95-102.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads7 ( #209,687 of 1,410,448 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #177,872 of 1,410,448 )
How can I increase my downloads?