Using mereological principles to support metaphysics

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):225-246 (2011)
Abstract Mereological principles are sometimes used to support general claims about the structure and arrangement of objects in the world. I focus initially on one such mereological principle, the weak supplementation principle (WSP). It is not obvious that (WSP) is prescribed by ordinary thinking about parthood. Further, (WSP) is not needed for a fairly strong formal characterization of the part–whole relation. For these reasons, some arguments relying on (WSP) might be countered by simply denying (WSP). I argue more generally that there is no reason to assume that one core mereology functions as a common basis for all plausible metaphysical theories
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,709
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-11-03

    Total downloads

    59 ( #16,458 of 549,754 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #63,425 of 549,754 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums