A Prosentential theory of truth
Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125 (1975)
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James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
James R. Beebe (2003). Attributive Uses of Prosentences. Ratio 16 (1):1–15.
Nuel Belnap (2006). Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
Dorothy L. Grover (1976). 'This Is False' on the Prosentential Theory. Analysis 36 (2):80 - 83.
Arvid Båve (2009). Why Is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun? Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
Michael J. Zimmerman (1978). Propositional Quantification and the Prosentential Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 34 (3):253 - 268.
Pierre Le Morvan (2004). Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):705 – 718.
P. D. Welch (2001). On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
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