Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):314-318 (1986)
|Abstract||In this paper I try to show that three of William L. Rowe’s criticisms of my book, Theism, are much less than conclusive.(1) Rowe agrees that I have established, via my defense of Descartes’s Meditation Five argument for God’s existence, that God is not a non-existing being. He denies, however, that it follows that God is an existing being. In reply, I reject the thesis that something might be neither an existing nor a non-existing object.(2) Rowe maintains that the impossibility of God’s non-existence might consist simply of its being the case that no one can destroy God---a kind of impossibility which is not strong enough to sustain my (S5) modal argument for God’s existence. In reply, I argue that the impossibility of God’s non-existence must be logical.(3) Rowe maintains that it may well be that religious experiencers have experienced God without experiencing him qua maximally great being, so that religious experiences do not provide us with a reason to believe that a maximally great being is logically possible. I argue in reply that if religious experiencers do not experience God qua supremely perfect, then they have no reason to believe that they experience God|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
William J. Wainwright (2005). Rowe on God's Freedom and God's Grace. Philo 8 (1):12-22.
William Hasker (2005). Can God Be Free?: Rowe's Dilemma for Theology. Religious Studies 41 (4):453-462.
Nick Trakakis (2006). Rowe's New Evidential Argument From Evil: Problems and Prospects. Sophia 45 (1).
William L. Rowe (2009). Alvin Plantinga on the Ontological Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2):87 - 92.
Brian Leftow (2005). No Best World: Moral Luck. Religious Studies 41 (2):165-181.
Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann (2003). Reply to Rowe. In Michael Peterson (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell.
Hugh J. McCann (2001). Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):110-116.
Klaas J. Kraay (2005). William L. Rowe's A Priori Argument for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy 22 (2):211-234.
David Woodruff (2005). What Probability Arguments Show. Philo 8 (2):63-83.
Peter Losin (1987). Experience of God and the Principle of Credulity. Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):59-70.
Georges Dicker (1988). A Refutation of Rowe's Critique of Anselm's Ontological Argument. Faith and Philosophy 5 (2):193-202.
Michael Almeida (2004). The New Evidential Argument Defeated. Philo 7 (1):22-35.
James Beilby (1996). Does the Empirical Problem of Evil Prove That Theism Is Improbable? Religious Studies 32 (3):315 - 323.
James Patrick Downey (1987). Commentary on “The Possibility of God”. Faith and Philosophy 4 (2):202-206.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads2 ( #232,265 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?