David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (3):177-187 (1979)
The detailed analysis of a particular quasi-historical numerical example is used to illustrate the way in which a Bayesian personalist approach to scientific inference resolves the Duhemian problem of which of a conjunction of hypotheses to reject when they jointly yield a prediction which is refuted. Numbers intended to be approximately historically accurate for my example show, in agreement with the views of Lakatos, that a refutation need have astonishingly little effect on a scientist's confidence in the ‘hard core’ of a successful research programme even when a comparable confirmation would greatly enhance that confidence . Timeo Danaos et dona ferentis
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Marcel Weber (2009). The Crux of Crucial Experiments: Duhem's Problems and Inference to the Best Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):19-49.
Joe Morrison (2010). Just How Controversial is Evidential Holism? Synthese 173 (3):335-352.
Greg Bamford (1996). Popper and His Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: A Close Shave for the Law of Gravitation? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):207-232.
Allan Franklin & Colin Howson (1984). Why Do Scientists Prefer to Vary Their Experiments? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 15 (1):51-62.
Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
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