Can instrumental value be intrinsic?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):137-157 (2012)
In this article, I critique a common claim that instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value. Instead, I offer an alternative dispositional analysis of instrumental value, which holds that instrumental value can, in certain circumstances, be an example of intrinsic value. It follows, then, that a popular account of the nature of final value – or value as an end – is false: the Moorean identification of final value with intrinsic value cannot properly distinguish between value as an end and value as a means
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01426.x
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B. J. C. Madison (2015). Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):n/a-n/a.

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