Online research in philosophy

This book is particularly appropriate for graduate seminars or upper division courses in philosophy of mind, and for metaphysics or introductory philosophy ...

Topics include immortality; materlialism; Descartes's 'Divisibility Argument' for dualism; the Argument from introspection'; the problems with...

Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience re-visits Collingwood's body of work and locates it in the context of the fundamental problems of philosophy and shows that Collingwood is both an influential and key philosophical figure of the twentieth century.

This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda.