Davidson and the Autonomy of the Human Sciences

Abstract
This chapter explores the kind of nonreductivism defended by Davidson and compares it with that which predominated in mid-century. Davidson’s argument for the autonomy of the human sciences is contrasted with the one developed by R. G. Collingwood as presented through the interpretative efforts of W. H. Dray. It is argued here that Davidson’s arguments against the anticausalist consensus that dominated the first half of the twentieth century were not conclusive and that the success of causalism in the latter half of the century is largely due to a return of heavy-duty metaphysics and an ontological backlash against the linguistic turn. Davidson, however, was able to preserve a kind of nonreductivism that is grounded in a distinction in kind between normative and descriptive sciences, rather than in a distinction in degree between sciences with greater or lower predictive power.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015561.003.0016
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,201
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Siegfried Dewitte (2006). Money and the Autonomy Instinct. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):184-185.
Jason Bridges (2006). Davidson's Transcendental Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):290-315.

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Added to index

2012-02-20

Total downloads

1 ( #842,646 of 1,940,949 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #457,798 of 1,940,949 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.