David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In this paper, I argue that a form of moral constructivism inspired by Hume's Enquiry yields a plausible response to the problem of relativity. Though this problem can be stated in many different ways, I argue that a Humean constructivism is far more universal in scope that Hume's positions are often taken to be. In addition, I argue that where Hume's position does imply a limited scope, this limitation is perfectly appropriate. I discuss four iterations of the relativity problem(s) here: the incorrigibility of local practices (local practices relativism), the relativity of fundamental moral principles (local principles relativism), the contingency of moral principles (modal relativism), and, in a short postscript, the limited scope of moral normativity (normative relativism). Humean Constructivism, I argue, delivers the proper verdict for each of these purported problems.
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