David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 48 (5):395-412 (2005)
This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda
|Keywords||Functionalism Idealism Metaphysics Mind Monism Reductivism Collingwood, Robin George Davidson, Donald Kim, Jaegwon|
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References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 75-96.
Tyler Burge (1993). Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
R. G. Collingwood (2005/2000). An Essay on Philosophical Method. Oxford University Press.
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Tim Crane (2001). Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Giuseppina D'Oro (2013). The Philosopher and the Grapes: On Descriptive Metaphysics and Why It Is Not 'Sour Metaphysics'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):586 - 599.
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