Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (1):187 - 189 (1995)
|Abstract||The basic idea by means of which Popper and Miller proved the non-existence of inductive probabilistic support in 1983/1985/1987, is used to prove that inductive probabilistic countersupport does exist. So it seems that after falsification has won over verification on the deductive side of science, countersupport wins over support on the inductive side|
|Keywords||Popper-Miller-anti-induction proof inductive countersupport inductive support Popper's laws of excess deductive independence|
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