David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Review 72 (October):500-501 (1963)
If we maintain that free will requires the absence of determinism, Then can we claim to be free without any wants? if we had no wants at all, What sense would there to be talk about free will? the difference between free will and the absence of free will is not that between indeterminism and determinism. Free choice presupposes determinism in that in order to make a choice an individual must have some motive or reason for so doing. The difference is found within determinism, Among the different kinds of motives that can influence an individual to make a choice. Furthermore, If I already possess the motive to change or eliminate undesirable motives then I increase my opportunity to realize more desires and thus increase freedom of choice, Even though my motive to change or eliminate undesirable motives is already predetermined
|Keywords||Compatibility Determinism Free Will Philosophical Anthropology Canfield, J|
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