Minds and Machines 16 (1) (2006)
|Abstract||The award of the 2003 Barwise Prize to Daniel Dennett by the American Philosophical Association signifies Dennett’s importance in the developing area of philosophical inquiry into computing and information. One source of Dennett’s intellectual stature is his command of scientific and engineering ideas, which he effectively applies to philosophical debates over machine intelligence, consciousness, and intentionality. Dennett regards the computer as both a model and a tool that will transform the ways that philosophy is pursued in the 21st century. In order to understand Dennett’s conception of how philosophy changes and fares, if his mechanistic and reductionist conception of the life of the mind succeeds, we turn to an examination of a central idea in Dennett’s thought: the intuition pump.|
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