On the supposed limits of physicalist theories of mind

Philosophical Studies 155 (2):207-225 (2011)
Is physicalism compatible with either panpsychism or so-called fundamental mentality ? Minimal physicalism, I contend, is compatible with both. We should therefore jettison the No Fundamental Mentality constraint, a proposed constraint on the definition of the physical , not to mention the false limits it places on physicalist theories of mind
Keywords The physical  Physicalism  Minimal physicalism  Panpsychism  Panpsychistic materialism  The fundamental  Fundamental mentality  Configurationism  Compatible  Compatibility  NFM constraint
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References found in this work BETA
David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Consciousness and Emotion in Cognitive Science: Conceptual and Empirical Issues 2 (3):200-19.
Ned Markosian (2000). What Are Physical Objects? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):375-395.

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