Peirce's “method of tenacity” and the “method of science”: The consistency of pragmatism and naturalism
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||In 1877 Peirce distinguished four different methods of “fixating our beliefs”, among which I here concentrate on what could be called the “method of tenacity” and the “method of science”. I then use these distinctions to argue that despite their apparent conflict, pragmatism, relying on the method of tenacity, and naturalism, relying on the method of science, can and should coexist, both in science and in metaphysics.|
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