Sleeping beauty: In defence of Elga
Analysis 62 (4):292–296 (2002)
| Abstract | Argues for the "thirder" solution to the Sleeping Beauty puzzle. The argument turns on an analogy with a variant case, in which a coin-toss on Monday night determines whether one's memories of Monday are permanently erased, or merely suspended in such a way that they will return some time after one wakes up on Tuesday. | |||||||||
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