Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554 (2010)
|Abstract||Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
M. Peterson, A. Hollis & T. Pogge (2010). A Critique in Need of Critique. Public Health Ethics 3 (2):178-185.
Donald Bruckner (2011). Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality. Acta Analytica 26 (4):367-385.
Torsten Wilholt (2009). Bias and Values in Scientific Research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (1):92-101.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). Where Do Preferences Come From? International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
Margaret P. Gilbert (2001). Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119.
D. M. Hausman (2011). Mistakes About Preferences in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):3-25.
Jonathan Aldred (2007). Intransitivity and Vague Preferences. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):377 - 403.
Marilyn Hamilton (2007). Approaching Homelessness: An Integral Re-Frame. World Futures 63 (2):107 – 126.
Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West (2007). Natural Myside Bias is Independent of Cognitive Ability. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (3):225 – 247.
Dominic Wilkinson (2009). Challenging the Status Quo. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 6 (2):235-237.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #28,197 of 739,347 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,347 )
How can I increase my downloads?