David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200 (2010)
In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of disjunctivism; and (iv) to argue that there is a related reason to prefer experiential intentionalism over Martin’s version of disjunctivism.
|Keywords||transparency perception hallucination Martin disjunctivism perceptual experience intentionalism naive realism representationalism|
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967). Zettel. Oxford, Blackwell.
Michael G. F. Martin (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Citations of this work BETA
Fabian Dorsch (2011). The Diversity of Disjunctivism. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):304-314.
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