Transparency and imagining seeing

Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200 (2011)
Abstract
One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F. Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly inconsistent.
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References found in this work BETA
Fabian Dorsch (2010). The Unity of Hallucinations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fabian Dorsch (2011). The Diversity of Disjunctivism. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):304-314.
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