David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Hypatia 26 (2):236-257 (2011)
Too often, identifying practices of silencing is a seemingly impossible exercise. Here I claim that attempting to give a conceptual reading of the epistemic violence present when silencing occurs can help distinguish the different ways members of oppressed groups are silenced with respect to testimony. I offer an account of epistemic violence as the failure, owing to pernicious ignorance, of hearers to meet the vulnerabilities of speakers in linguistic exchanges. Ultimately, I illustrate that by focusing on the ways in which hearers fail to meet speaker dependency in a linguistic exchange, efforts can be made to demarcate the different types of silencing people face when attempting to testify from oppressed positions in society.
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Elizabeth Barnes (2016). Reply to Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu. Res Philosophica 93 (1):295-309.
Luvell Anderson (2015). Racist Humor. Philosophy Compass 10 (8):501-509.
Kristie Dotson (2014). Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression. Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
Gaile Pohlhaus Jr (2014). Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice. Social Epistemology 28 (2):99-114.
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